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PREMIUM COUPONS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A manufacturer in another state inserted premium coupons in
packages of merchandise, which were then enclosed in larger
parcels and shipped into Florida, passing through wholesale and
retail dealers to the ultimate purchaser. The latter redeemed,
according to the usual course of business, by procuring a pre-
mium, which was transmitted to him either directly from the
manufacturer or from some appointed agency in another state.
The state of Florida imposed a license tax upon the coupons in
the hands of the retail merchant. Held, that the coupons were
not protected from the tax under the interstate commerce clause
of the Federal Constitution.1
If regarded as a chattel, the coupon in question was clearly an
article of commerce, as having a money value in the market by
1 Rast v. Van Dentan & Lewis Co., 36 Supr. Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 370.
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virtue of the premium to be drawn by it.2  This was conceded in
the principal case.3
The coupon was, therefore, at some time within the protection
of the interstate commerce clause. This protection, once attached,
is not withheld until the completion of the original transaction
pursuant to which the importation was made. A line of decisions
brings out clearly the principle that it is not the transfer of the
legal title, nor the termination of the original continuous transit
in the physical sense, which marks the end of the interstate com-
merce relation, but the fulfillment of the immediate purpose of
the importation.4 Thus, if a principal ships goods across a state
line to his agent, who stores and eventually delivers them pursuant
to the orders of customers, the interstate transaction terminates
with the storage of the goods.' Similarly, if a peddler receives
goods from without the state and subsequently sells them as agent
of the shipper, the delivery to the peddler fulfils the immediate
purpose of the importation.6 Where, on the other hand, the ship-
ment is made by a principal in one state to an agent in the other,
the latter distributing pursuant to the contracts previously made
between the principal and the purchaser, delivery to the purchaser
is necessary to consummate the interstate transaction.
7
At what point is the immediate purpose of the shipper fulfilled
in the principal case? The court places it at the sale of the
original packages. This may be conceded so far as the merchan-
dise contained in the packages is concerned. But does the coupon
necessarily parjake of the character of the merchandise in this
respect? It was not directed to, nor intended for, the intermedi-
ate dealers. Nothing is made to turn in the case on the question
whether the latter were aware of the existence of the coupon or
not. In either case, it was with the retail purchaser only that the
manufacturer dealt, so far as the coupon was concerned. All
other parties were mere conduits between the two. In the words
of the principal case, "Detach the importation from the retail sale,
" Champion v. Ames, ISS U. S. 321.
'Prin. case, 376.
4Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147; Rhodes v. Iowa, i7o U. S.
412.
5American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500.
0Machine Co. v. Gage, ioo U. S. 676; Emert v. Mo., 156 U. S. 296.
7 Norfolk W. R. Co. v. Sims, 191 U. S. 441. See Kehrer v. Stewart,
197 U. S. 6o, 65.
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consider only the transportation to the state, of merchandise in its
original package, * * * and there may be interstate commerce,
but so detached and so considered the importations are left with-
out purpose, the scheme without execution."s
The court, however, applies rigidly the original package rule.
Yet this rule is merely one of several guides to the determination
of when the interstate transaction has ended.9 When the purpose
of the shipper clearly was not fulfilled with the breakage of the
original package, the rule does not apply. This is well recognized
in cases where agents receive goods in the original package, then
break the package and deliver to customers in fulfillment of the
contracts of the principal.Y0 The shipment in the principal case
was not, indeed, pursuant to a preexisting contractual relationship
between the manufacturer and the ultimate purchaser. Never-
theless it was in consummation of a direct dealing between them.
Admittedly the holding of the principal case involves the exclu-
sion of congressional regulation of the coupons after the sale in
the original package.' But has not Congress the power to
authorize this traffic, and should it not have also the power to
protect it from state interference that would render the traffic not
merely valueless but devoid of meaning? "It is inconceivable
that the power to authorize this traffic * * * should cease at
a point when its continuance is indispensable to its value."'
2
The principal case dismisses with a word the effect of the
ultimate redemption by premium in determining the interstate
character of the transaction.' 3 This, it is submitted, is to ignore
a serious difficulty. Numerous decisions have held that a con-
tract may partake of the character of interstate commerce, not
from the relative positions of the contracting parties, but from
the nature of the performance contemplated. 4 Is not the trans-
mission of a coupon having in view a redemption by the delivery
of a premium across state lines, one of the "initiatory and inter-
" Prin. case, 376.
'Cook v. Marshall, 196 U. S. 261.
"0Caldwell v. N. C., 187 U. S. 622; Rearick v. Penn, 203 U. S. 507.
Prin. case, 376.
" Brown v. Md., 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419, 446-7.
"Prin. case, 375.
"
4Robbins v. Shelby Co., i2o U. S. 489; McCall v. Cal., 136 U. S. io4;
Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211; Swift v. U. S., i96 U. S.
375; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27.
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vening acts and dealings that directly bring about (a) sale or
exchange" by interstate commerce?
That foreign insurance policiesp1 foreign bills of exchange,16
and contracts for future delivery,1 7 are not within the protection
of interstate commerce is established. None of these contracts,
however, when considered with reference to the usual methods
of performance, necessarily contemplate the use of interstate
channels.1 " Very different is the contract between the sender and
the recipient of the premium coupon. This necessarily contem-
plates the delivery of a commodity, or its money equivalent, from
without the state.
Both as a commodity, of present value, therefore, and as a
contract for a future performance, we submit that the premium
coupon should have been regarded as within the protection of the
interstate commerce clause.
C. R. W.
' Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U. S.) I68.
"
8 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. (U. S.) 73.
IT Ware v. Mobile, 209 U. S. 405.
Ib. 413. "In neither class of contracts, for sale or purchase, was
there necessarily any movement of commodities in interstate traffic
because of the contracts made by the brokers."
